

Death in the Middle East: An Analysis of How the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* Framed Killings in the Second Palestinian Intifada*

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Abstract

This paper analyzed *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* newspaper coverage of killings in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The purpose of the study was to analyze how the two newspapers framed the political violence of Israelis and Palestinians to find out what specific framing devices the newspapers used to express positions. Findings from the content analysis employed here suggest that the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* framed Israeli-Palestinian conflict violence in such a way as to legitimate Israeli killings by implicitly justifying Israeli violence and assigning more prominence to the Israeli perspective. Results also suggest that the newspapers de-legitimated Palestinian violence by implicitly condemning Palestinian killings.

Keywords: Israel, Palestinian, intifada, framing, Mideast, New York Times, Chicago Tribune.

*The author would like to thank Professor Dan Wackman of the University of Minnesota for his insights and feedback on key sections of this paper.

INTRODUCTION

The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians remains one of the most important quandaries for world affairs because of its far-reaching implications. Already having produced several wars, the conflict remains arguably one of the greatest threats to world peace and stability. Combined, the tension that the conflict creates between Israel and neighboring Arab states and the anti-American sentiments that rise out of America's support for Israel (see Telhami, 2002; Khalidi, 2004; Kimmerling, 2003), bring with them the lasting threat of war.

The United States is at the political center of the Israel-Palestinian conflict (Chomsky, 1999; Khalidi, 2004; Kimmerling, 2003). Not only has America been the key mediator between the two sides in recent decades, it also has a very close relationship with Israel, providing Israel with diplomatic and military support that includes large amounts of annual aid (Chomsky, 1999; Telhami, 2002). Israeli Scholar Shibley Telhami says:

America *is* a key player in the Arab-Israeli issue. The American commitment to Israel... often pits the United States against all others in international organizations (Telhami, 2002, p. 178).

One factor thought to have some bearing on outcomes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is American media coverage. Press coverage in the United States can impact the conflict through its influence on American public opinion about United States Middle East policies. Public opinion is key because in a democracy such as America's, government policies cannot develop and thrive without general, tacit public support. By all accounts, Americans recognize the importance of the Israel-Palestine conflict. A Pew Research Center news interest index published during the earlier stages of the second Palestinian *intifada* (uprising) called the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "one of the most closely followed foreign news stories not directly involving Americans in the [index's] history" (Pew Research Center, 2002).

A sizeable body of scholarly research and commentary about American media coverage of the conflict has been produced, most of it attempting to assess the extent and direction of bias. Not surprisingly considering America's close relationship with Israel and American media's tendency to support official government positions (Herman and Chomsky, 2002), the overwhelming preponderance of research evidence suggests that American news coverage sharply favors Israel (see Dunsky, 2008/2001; Friel and Falk, 2007; Viser, 2003; Ross, 2003; Ackerman, 2001b). This research attempts to add more depth to this growing body of research through its detailed examination of *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* coverage of Israeli and Palestinian killings. The study's contribution lies in its clarification of *how* two elite American newspapers express their pro-Israel positions and, perhaps more importantly, delineation of a conceptual framework which can be applied more generally to analyses of violent political conflicts.

Specifically, this research content analyzes *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* newspaper coverage of killings in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from about one-year before to one-year after September 11, 2001, a time span covering roughly the first two years of the second Palestinian *intifada* (uprising). The purpose of the study is to analyze how the newspapers frame the violent actions of Israelis and Palestinians to find out what specific framing devices are employed. Coverage of killings specifically was studied because of the likelihood that the position of a newspaper will manifest itself most clearly in the context of violence.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT MEDIA COVERAGE

A fair amount of empirical research and commentary about American press coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict exists. The majority of scholars and observers have concluded that American news media have historically framed the conflict in a way that sharply favors Israel. Some evidence exists, however, of more balanced coverage surrounding Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel in the late 1970's (see Adams and Heyl, 1981; and Asi, 1981) and around the time of the first Palestinian intifada in the late 1980's (see Noakes and Wilkins, 2002). Analyses of coverage since the second intifada have almost unanimously concluded that coverage has been pro-Israeli (Dunsky, 2008; Friel and Falk, 2007; Viser, 2003; Ross, 2003; Ackerman, 2001a; and Ackerman, 2001b).

Coverage in the 1970's

Although research has found that American press coverage of the Israel-Palestinian conflict has generally favored Israel, studies of 1970's coverage show that more balanced coverage was provided toward the end of that decade around the time of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel. Specifically, studies found that coverage at that time was less positive (but still not generally negative) toward Israel, very positive toward Sadat and Egypt, less negative (but still not positive) toward Palestinians, and negative toward non-Egyptian Arabs.

According to a content analysis of American network news programs in the 1970's by Adams and Heyl (1981), coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict changed directions near the end of the decade and coverage of Israel became less positive. A 1981 study by media scholar Morad Asi content analyzed American weekday newscasts at three points in time—1973, 1976/77, and 1979 (after the Sadat visit)—and confirmed the findings of Adams and Heyl. Bagneid and Schneider

(1981) studied Sadat's visit to Israel and confirmed the positive coverage of Sadat, but concluded that coverage of Israel also remained, for the most part, positive.

Coverage Since the First Intifada

More recent studies have analyzed American press coverage of the conflict since the first *intifada* broke out in 1987. Studying *New York Times* coverage of the conflict at three different time periods — December 1987 through December 1988, September 10, 2000 through September 10, 2001, and September 11, 2001 through December 11, 2001 — Viser (2003) found that the paper has become increasingly pro-Israeli as time has gone by. Specifically, the newspaper has used a higher percentage of Israeli sources and more Israeli end quotes and personalized Israeli deaths more than Palestinian deaths.

A study by Noakes and Wilkins (2002) found that *New York Times* and Associated Press frames of Palestinians during the years 1984 to 1998 became less negative during and after the first Palestinian uprising, which began in 1987.

A Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) study by Ackerman analyzed National Public Radio's coverage of deaths during the early stages of the second Palestinian *intifada*. The study found that during the six-month sample period Israeli deaths were significantly more likely to be reported than Palestinian deaths, and that only 20% of Palestinian children deaths were covered compared to 89% of Israeli children deaths (Ackerman, 2001a).

Ross' (2003) framing analysis of *New York Times* editorial coverage of the second *intifada* before and after September 11th concluded that editorials tended to frame Palestinians as aggressors, Israelis as victims, and "depersonalize Palestinians."

Dunsky's (2008) analysis found that from 2000 – 2004 American news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict closely mirrored official US policy. Dunsky suggests that America's

pro-Israel policy bias went largely unaccounted in American news. The analysis also revealed that American news largely neglected essential issues like Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlements, and that American news reports of violence did not accurately reflect the conditions on the ground because they were taken uncritically from official Israeli government sources. Dunsky's findings confirm what other analysts have noted – an absence of context that favors Israel. For example, Findley (1995) and Lee and Solomon (1990) refer specifically to American media's ignoring of Israeli abuses of Palestinians. Ackerman (2001b) and Dunsky (2001), meanwhile, mentioned more broadly the absence of general context in coverage of the conflict, including the American press's tendency to explicitly mention Israeli reasons for fighting while ignoring Palestinian reasons.

Friel and Falk's 2007 book *Israel-Palestine On Record* focuses exclusively on how *New York Times* news reports and editorials talked about the conflict from 2000 to 2006. The analysis found that the Times highlighted Israeli civilian deaths while largely ignoring Palestinian civilian deaths, supported the Israeli contention that its military incursions are acts of self-defense, failed to hold Israel and the United States accountable for repeated violations of international law, and ignored Palestinian rights and claims to international law.

Structural Explanations

The relative one-sidedness expressed by the American press in its coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict may be surprising to observers who conceive of the United States press as an independent watchdog which seeks 'truth' and covers events objectively. However, scholars examining the government-press dynamic in America have noted that the American press does not always act independently of the government and, in fact, usually supports and protects government interests and the official government line (Altschull, 1995; Bennett, 2007; Jamieson and Waldman, 2003; Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien, 1995; Herman and Chomsky, 2002). American press

acquiescence is more pronounced on foreign issues, about which the American public tends to have less knowledge, and during times of crisis (Jamieson and Waldman, 2003). Given the power wielded by the Israel lobby in the United States (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008) and resultant United States pro-Israel policy biases (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; Findley, 1995), the American press's historic support for Israel is not surprising.

Many structural factors explain the American press's support of the government, including a deeply entrenched propaganda system which ensures that news conforms to the interests of power brokers (Herman and Chomsky, 2002);¹ vast government public relations efforts (Bennett, 2007; Altschull, 1995); patterned routines of news work (see Schudson, 1997; Berkowitz, 1997; Gans, 1979; and Tuchman, 1978); and the fact that journalists cannot divorce themselves from their values, which often match the values of those in power (Gans, 1979).

¹ Herman and Chomsky's (2002) "propaganda model" explains how a set of five filters – consolidation of media ownership, the press's reliance on advertising as a revenue source, the symbiotic relationship between journalists and elite sources, continuous criticism of the media by the government and other power brokers, and the creation of enemy as a control mechanism – ultimately determine what news is "fit to print."

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Ameer (2009) draws from Parsons (1986) to argue that military conflicts are often diplomatic struggles for legitimation. The side that is able to succeed in legitimating its perspective gains the authority to define its opponent as aggressor and itself as victim.

A primary contribution of this research is its delineation of a conceptualization of legitimation and de-legitimation, which this section will detail. The conceptualization of legitimation and de-legitimation can facilitate understanding of American news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other violent political conflicts. Prior to describing the conceptualization, media framing theory will be discussed briefly. Media framing is an important concept because legitimation and del-legitimation are expressed through the media framing process.

Media Framing

Media Framing theory can offer important insights into how American media create and express pro-Israel positions. Media framing suggests that the way information is packaged and presented can define problems and issues and provide coherence and meaning for communication receivers (see Gamson and Modigliani, 1987; Valkenburg et al., 1999). According to Gamson (1989), manifest content is given meaning and coherence through framing.

Media scholar Robert Entman (1993) described framing as a process that plays itself out through the use of various textual devices such as metaphors, catchphrases, associations, depictions, placement and repetition. In the following oft-cited quote Entman explains clearly how the framing process proceeds:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text... Texts can make bits of information more salient by placement or repetition, or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols (Entman, 1993, p. 53).

Entman also suggested that frames have at least four locations in the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. For the purposes of this study, the location that is of most importance is the text. The text, says Entman, “contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences” (1993, p. 52). Using this description of the role of text in producing a frame as a basis, this study considers a frame to be the outcome of a process. As such, this study focuses not only on specific frames produced by the newspapers, but also on other techniques employed in reports as part of the overall framing process. For example, use of keywords and information sourcing will be analyzed because, as Entman indicated, they are part of the larger framing process.

Legitimation: A Conceptual Framework

Although framing does not always imply a lack of fairness or balance in coverage, certain frames can be used to unfairly characterize people or events or express support for people or events. The argument here is that when media framing *does* act to create either unfairly negative portrayals or enthusiastically positive ones, it does so through a process of legitimation and/or de-legitimation. Legitimation, in this conception, refers to the act of making something – violent acts,

for the purposes of this study – valid, justifiable, reasonable and right. To de-legitimize is to suggest that something is evil, criminal and unacceptable. In this sense, then, it is through legitimation and de-legitimation that media present favorable or unfavorable views about people and events.

Types of Legitimation

It is proposed here that in covering violent actions, specifically killings, media will often legitimate violent actions by resorting inevitably to three types, or forms, of legitimation/de-legitimation. The first type of legitimation is *justification*. That is, media will tend to legitimate some killings by making them seem justifiable through a process of implicit or explicit justification. For example, as will be shown below, a killing that is framed as self-defense is justified and, therefore, legitimated. The second type of legitimation/de-legitimation, *condemnation*, represents a form of de-legitimation. Media will de-legitimize some killings by implicitly condemning them by describing them as unnecessarily aggressive, criminal or cruel. The third type of legitimation is *prominence*, which refers to media's legitimizing of a particular perspective or point of view by making it more prominent than another. Allowing one side to voice itself more than another side, or giving more importance to stories expressing a particular point of view, are two of the ways to assign prominence.

Justification: As this section has so far argued, in coverage of violence there are three major types of legitimation/de-legitimation, two of which represent forms of legitimation and one which represents a form of de-legitimation. The first type of legitimation/de-legitimation is justification, which legitimates acts of violence by making the perpetrators and/or their action seem justified. This is done in four major ways, or stated differently, there are four major indicators of justification.

1. Self-Defense
2. War
3. Explicit Rationale
4. Accident

Self-Defense

The first indicator of justification is self-defense, which refers to a situation in which someone *needed* to kill in order to prevent serious injury or death from being inflicted upon him/herself or others. When media frame an act of killing as an act of self-defense, they offer a particularly powerful justification for the killing because self-defense is, perhaps, one of the few universally acceptable reasons for killing. Sometimes, but not always, catchwords such as “retaliation” and “response” are used to signal a self-defense/security frame. However, media frequently frame acts of violence as acts of self-defense/security without using such keywords. Consider the following example:

The uprising took two more lives Sunday when Israeli soldiers shot two Palestinians, one of whom allegedly was trying to plant a roadside bomb at a Jewish settlement near Jerusalem (Dellios, 2000b).

The sentence makes clear that had the Palestinians not been killed, a roadside bomb would have placed Israeli settlers in grave danger. The implication — that the violent act was carried out in self-defense/security — is clear. In this way, the killings are justified.

War/battle

Another indicator of justification is war, which describes a violent situation which was participated in equally by two or more consenting sides. When media talk about killings as having occurred during war or in a battle, they justify the killings implicitly because warfare is considered (by many people) to be a justifiable expression of violence, or at least not nearly as criminal as violence perpetrated by murderers, vigilantes, or terrorist groups. Although the violence of war is

not as universally accepted as self-defense, many people will likely consider an equal battle as an inevitable political reality which sometimes can not be avoided, even by good, well-intentioned people. War violence is especially likely to be justifiable in the eyes of observers when they do not fully understand the context of the struggle or know, for example, which side started the conflict and why the sides are fighting in the first place. Since many Americans do not understand the complexities of the Israel-Palestine conflict (see Christison, 2001), war frames are likely to serve as justifications of violence for many news consumers. The following example will illustrate the way a war/battle frame can implicitly justify acts of violence.

At least one Palestinian was killed in a firefight (Torriero, 2001).

In this example, “firefight” signals that two consenting sides are engaged in battle. The killing is thus framed as an act of war and the death as a casualty of war.

Media also use specific terminology² when referring to a particular side in a conflict as though the side is taking part in a war and their actions are war-time engagements. This way of talking about a side in a conflict can create the impression that killings committed by that side are consequences of war. For example, terms such as “troops”, “army”, and “military incursion” indicate that a war is taking place and can serve to justify killings in the same way done by the war/battle frame just described. This section of a May 4, 2002 *New York Times* article uses war terminology:

Israeli soldiers launched a raid today..., underscoring that Israeli military operations in the West Bank have not ended (Chivers, 2002).

² Media use such terminology (to refer to a particular side) not only in their discussion of specific acts of violence committed, but rather more generally in their descriptions of other news and events.

This passage contains several references that are suggestive of war. “Israeli soldiers,” “raid”, and “military operations” evoke images of war and act, therefore, to legitimate violence through justification.

Explicit Rationale

News reports sometimes mention a specific reason why a killing operation was carried out. Providing explicit rationale serves in most cases to legitimate killings because specific reasons give an understanding that killings were not committed haphazardly. The following example illustrates:

A suicide bomber blew himself up today... The bomber... left a note saying he was trying to avenge the killings last week of five Palestinian children by an Israeli bomb... (Bennet, 2001a).

In this example, the article’s clear mention of an explicit rationale — to avenge previous killings of children — could allow readers to sympathize with the killer’s position by giving them some understanding why the killer did what he did.

Accident

Another way for media to justify killings is by framing them as accidents, which describe seemingly unintentional acts. For instance, in the following example Israel intended to kill a “militia leader”, but killed other people by mistake:

The Israeli army attacked a Palestinian militia leader with a helicopter gunship Thursday, missing him but killing two others... (Dellios, 2001b).

In this example, the attack was on the militia leader, who was the intended target. Readers would probably recognize a “militia leader” as a fair target. The implication is that, since the “militia leader” was the target, the two people killed must have been killed mistakenly. Such a

killing is likely to seem like a forgivable mistake in the minds of many readers because people generally excuse others for things done unintentionally.

Condemnation: Condemnation is the second type of legitimation/de-legitimation and constitutes a type of de-legitimation. Condemnation refers to the explicit or implicit declaration that something is wrong and unacceptable. There are four major indicators of condemnation:

1. Aggression
2. Criminality
3. Cruelty
4. Humanization

Aggression

Media condemn, and therefore de-legitimize, killings by attributing aggression to the violent actions and those who carry them out. Aggressiveness is characterized by the unnecessary initiation of hostilities for no (stated) reason. Consider the following:

In the continuing violence, a 15-year-old Palestinian youth was killed near the Jewish settlement of Netzarim on Wednesday. Palestinian hospital officials said the youth was passing by the settlement when he was shot by soldiers without reason (Dellios, 2001a).

The Israeli-perpetrated killing described here is framed as an act of aggression. First, it is pointed out early on that the person killed was a youth and that he was only “passing by.” Second, Palestinian sources claim he was shot “without reason.”

Criminality

The press may also condemn killings and killers by attributing criminality. Criminality represents a powerful form of de-legitimation because people generally denounce criminal actions. Media attribute criminality through the use of specific terminology related to crime. Words such as “terrorist,” “extremist,” and “fundamentalist,” help to de-legitimize violence because of their criminal connotations. Consider this example:

The remote-controlled bomb, which Israeli officials blamed on Palestinian terrorists, flung the bus into a storefront... (Dellios, 2000a).

“Terrorism” is a commonly used de-legitimizing term that indicates criminal activity. Here, the word “terrorists” signals that a crime was committed.

Cruelty

Media can also condemn, and therefore de-legitimize, killings and killers by attributing a high degree of cruelty. Media condemn killings in this way through the use of specific terminology indicating cruelty. Words such as “savage”, “barbaric” and “massacre” indicate the unusually cruel nature of killings. Consider the following:

‘We didn’t expect them to be as savage as this,’ Hameid said Dellios, 2001c).

Humanization

Finally, the press may also de-legitimize violence by humanizing slain people in news reports and, in so doing, condemning their killers. Providing personal details about slain people – including name, information about family life, hobbies, and occupation – serves to indirectly condemn and de-legitimize killers because it highlights the simple humanity of the deceased people and their similarities with consumers of news. Such attention to personal details could logically generate sympathy on the part of news consumers. The following excerpt offers an example of humanization:

Killed in the explosion was Hanan Levy, 53, a lawyer who often ate lunch in the area near the explosion. Ayelet Hashahar-Levy, mother of a 3-year old child... was also killed (Sontag, 2000).

Prominence: Prominence is the third type of legitimation/de-legitimation and can constitute a powerful type of legitimation. Prominence refers to the press’s ability to make one perspective or point of view stand out more than others.

It is important to make a distinction between this type of legitimation/de-legitimation and the other two types previously discussed. Whereas justification and condemnation deal specifically with killings, prominence refers in some cases to coverage about specific killings and in other cases to general coverage about a particular side in an ongoing violent conflict. When media assign prominence to a particular point of view by allowing it to be expressed more clearly than another point of view, they show preference for and legitimate that point of view. Media use certain reporting conventions to express this form of legitimation. The following are indicators of prominence:

1. Sourcing
2. Placement of coverage

Sourcing

Media make one side's perspective more prominent than another by allowing it to voice itself more. More specifically, quoting one side consistently more often than another side can serve to legitimate the perspective of the more regularly quoted side.

Placement of Coverage

Media can legitimate one side in a conflict by displaying news about it more noticeably. Placing articles on the front page, for example, assigns a certain level of importance to a story and shows a newspaper's concern for it. Within a story, placing information higher up (in the headline, or the lead paragraph, for example) signals its importance. For example, a November 30, 2001 *New York Times* article covers the deaths of four Israelis and two Palestinians. While three of the four Israeli deaths are mentioned in the headline and the lead paragraph, the two Palestinian deaths are not mentioned until the story's 11th paragraph (Bennet, 2001b).

In summary, when media project bias, they do so through legitimation and de-legitimation. Legitimation/de-legitimation of violent acts is of three types: justification, condemnation, and prominence, and each of these comes with multiple indicators. These forms of legitimation are expressed through the media framing process.

With all this in mind, and in light of past research indicating a pro-Israeli bias in American media, the following hypotheses are put forth:

- **H1:** Through a combination of elements of the framing process, the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* will legitimate Israeli killings through justification more often than Palestinian killings.
- **H2:** Through a combination of elements of the framing process, the two newspapers will de-legitimize Palestinian killings through condemnation more often than Israeli killings by describing Palestinian killings as unnecessarily aggressive and criminal and by humanizing Israeli deceased people.
- **H3:** Through the use of certain reporting conventions, the two newspapers will legitimate the Israeli side more often than the Palestinian side by assigning more prominence to the Israeli perspective than the Palestinian perspective.

METHODOLOGY

In order to assess legitimation and de-legitimation of violence in *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* newspaper coverage of the ongoing intifada, a content analysis was employed. The *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* were selected because of their general influence as two of the largest American newspapers and because of their geographic and political diversity. Coverage studied spans from September 30, 2000, the day after the outbreak of the second intifada, to August 25, 2002. This 696-day period represents nearly the first two years of the

uprising and includes 348 days on either side of the September 11, 2001 attacks. It was desired to retrieve articles on both sides of the September 11th attacks because doing so would balance out any changes in coverage patterns that may have been caused by the historic and potentially catalytic event.

Identifying and Selecting ‘Death Days’³

In order to identify articles that covered Israeli-Palestinian killings, documentation of all Israeli-Palestinian conflict related deaths taking place during the nearly two years in question was obtained using a Middle East Policy Council data file. The ‘death days’ (as indicated by the file of deaths) were considered a starting point from which to search for newspaper coverage of Israeli and Palestinian deaths.

The file of deaths was broken down into categories of ‘death days’ in order to facilitate analysis and cross-comparison. Three broad categories were created:

1. **‘Israeli only’ death days** = days on which only an Israeli(s) died
2. **‘Palestinian only’ death days** = days on which only a Palestinian(s) died
3. **‘Both’ death days** = days on which at least one on each side was killed.

Since, according to the file of deaths, the number of days on which only an Israeli(s) died were few, the entire population of ‘Israeli only’ death days (**n= 34**) was selected for analysis. The file of deaths indicated a very high number of ‘Palestinian only’ death days (n=351). Since comparing such a high number with only 34 ‘Israeli only’ death days would not make for a fair comparison, and furthermore since including such a large population of death days would make any analysis unruly, a random sample of **87** ‘Palestinian only’ death days was taken. Finally, as to the ‘both’ death days category, all days producing at least one Israeli death *and* at least one

³ A ‘death day’ is a day on which someone in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was killed.

Palestinian death were selected for analysis ($n=145$). The entire population of 'both' death days was selected because the researcher desired to make the final sample of articles as large as possible and because a 'both' death day offers perhaps the best comparison of coverage of Israeli and Palestinian death and violence. The total number of death days considered for coverage was 266 ($87 + 34 + 145$).

Article Selection and Retrieval

Electronic newspaper databases (Lexis Nexis for the *New York Times* and Proquest for the *Chicago Tribune*) were searched on the days following death incidents. In all cases, the searches sought to identify the one article in each newspaper that came closest to summarizing the previous day's Israeli-Palestinian violence.

In the case of the *New York Times*, a search of the newspaper's index preceded the Lexis Nexis search. The index was read in advance of Lexis Nexis searches in order to assist in selecting only one of the sometimes several *New York Times* articles published daily about the conflict. Searches of 266 *New York Times* editions identified a total of 217 articles covering the previous day's Israeli-Palestinian deaths. Six articles were not accessible, leaving a total of 211 *New York Times* articles for analysis.

The Proquest searches of 266 *Chicago Tribune* editions identified a total of 153 articles covering the previous day's death(s). In all, then, 364 articles covering death, 211 from the *New York Times* and 153 from the *Chicago Tribune*, were analyzed.

Coding

A coding scheme (see appendix) was designed to measure all the indicators of justification, condemnation, and prominence. Two undergraduate coders were trained extensively on the coding scheme. Initial reliability tests conducted on about 20% of the coded material demonstrated lower than desired inter-coder reliability scores. The coders were re-trained on the coding scheme until they became proficient and agreement levels were acceptable. In general, intercoder reliability was acceptable for all 15 variables (see Appendix 2).

Two intercoder reliability measures—percentage agreement and scott's pi—were used to assess reliability. For 9 of the 15 variables, both percentage agreement and scott's pi statistics reached acceptable levels.⁴ One variable (#14) produced a slightly lower than desired percent agreement score (79%), but achieved an acceptable level of scott's pi (.61). Since there were three content categories, and because scott's pi was acceptable, this variable was kept in the study. Two variables — 20/35/37, and 25/42/46 — produced good percentage agreement scores, but lower than desired scott's pi scores. Both of these variables were kept because percentage scores were acceptable and because scott's pi does not give an appropriate measure of reliability for these variables.⁵ Three variables — 22/39/43, 23/40/44, and 24/41/45 — produced lower than desired reliability scores on both percent agreement and scott's pi. For two reasons, however, the decision was made to keep these three variables in the study. First, the general direction of all three

⁴ According to Shoemaker (2003), .60 constitutes an acceptable scott's pi. For the purposes of this study, 85% percent agreement was considered acceptable.

⁵ Researchers (see Holsti, 1969; Lombard, et al., 2002; and Schiff, 2004) have demonstrated that scott's pi is in some cases not an adequate measure of reliability because it produces an overly conservative result. In dichotomous coding, which was used almost exclusively in this analysis, scott's pi often requires near perfect agreement. Schiff (2004) says, "In coding schemes where a content category is absent 90 percent of the time, coders would have to agree in 97 percent of the cases to reach the 80 percent level of *pi*." In this study, variable 25/42/46 provides an illustrative example of why scott's pi is not always an appropriate measure by itself. For this variable, the coders agreed on 89% of the time, but scott's pi was just .51.

variables was toward intercoder agreement, with all three producing percent agreement scores greater than 70% and two producing Scott's pi measures considered nearly "adequate" by Shoemaker (2003). Second, coding errors on 25-30% of articles on the final coded sample (if we assume coder disagreement would translate equally to errors on the final sample) would be unlikely to alter the general thrust of the results since all three variables ultimately produced drastic statistical differences between Israeli-perpetrated and Palestinian-perpetrated killings. Since the final results are based on articles coded by each of the two coders, the stark differences mean that the two coders must have agreed on the on the whole of the sample, if not on individual articles.⁶

RESULTS

This section will present results of the content analysis. First, instances when newspaper articles covered *either* an Israeli or a Palestinian death will be compared. Second, results of the analysis of articles covering 'both' death days (i.e. days on which at least one Palestinian *and* one Israeli death occurred) will be presented.

Results Part I - 'Palestinian Only' Versus 'Israeli Only' Death Days

On days in which only Palestinians were killed, Israeli killers and killings were generally justified by the newspapers and the Palestinian deaths were not highlighted. On days in which only Israelis were killed, Palestinian killers and killings were consistently condemned, and the fact that Israelis were killed was given high prominence.

⁶ For example (as table 2 in the results section shows), Palestinian killings were condemned as acts of aggression in 95% of articles describing only Israeli deaths, compared to just 38% for Israeli killings in articles describing only Palestinian deaths. In order for such a stark difference to have been observed, each coder must have found that, on the whole, articles condemned Palestinians as aggressors and did not condemn Israelis as such.

Justification

Hypothesis 1 predicted that the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* would, through framing, provide justification for Israeli killings more than Palestinian killings. More specifically, it was expected that tests of each of the indicators of justification (self-defense, war, explicit rationale, and accident) would reveal a consistent pattern of legitimizing Israeli killings. As table 1 shows, hypothesis 1 was strongly supported.

Table 1: Justification for Israeli and Palestinian killings (on days when only one side was killed)

		Israeli Killers/killings	Palestinian Killers/killings	Total
		n=88	n=58	N=146
Frames	Self-Defense/security	52%*	16%*	38%
	War/battle	55%*	3%*	34%
	Explicit Rationale	63%*	29%*	49%
	Accident	11%*	2%*	8%
Terms	War	97%*	28%*	71%

Self-Defense/security Frame: $X^2=20.1$ (df=1), $p<.001$, War/Battle Frame: $X^2=40.5$ (df=1), $p<.001$, Explicit Rationale: $X^2=15.4$ (df=1), $p<.001$, Accident Frame: $X^2=4.7$ (df=1), $p<.031$, War terminology: $X^2=78.1$ (df=1), $p<.001$

As the table shows, there was a consistent pattern of implicitly and explicitly justifying Israeli killings on days when only Palestinians were killed. The opposite pattern was found for Palestinian killings on days when only Israelis were killed.

Fifty-two percent of articles covering Israeli killings used self-defense/security frames. Conversely, Palestinian killings were only framed as acts of self-defense/security in 16% of articles describing Palestinian killings [$X^2=20.1$ (df=1), $p<.001$]. Israeli killings were framed as acts of war in 55% of articles describing Israeli killings, while articles covering Palestinian killings almost never (3%) used a war frame [$X^2=40.5$ (df=1), $p<.001$]. Also, articles covering Israeli

killings usually (63%) provided explicit rationale, while such rationale was rarely (29% of articles) provided for Palestinian killings [$X^2=15.4$ (df=1), $p<.001$]. Although accident frames were rarely used by the newspapers to describe conflict killings, articles describing Israeli killings were more likely than Palestinian killings (11% to only 2%) to be framed as accidents [$X^2=4.7$ (df=1), $p<.031$].

The papers also used specific terms to justify Israeli killings more than Palestinian killings. War terminology was used in 97% of articles describing Israeli killings, but in only 28% of articles describing Palestinian killings [$X^2=78.1$ (df=1), $p<.001$].

Condemnation

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the newspapers would condemn Palestinian killings more often than Israeli killings. Table 2 indicates that hypothesis 2 was generally supported, although one indicator was not supported.

Table 2: *Condemnation of Israeli and Palestinian killings (only one side was killed)*

		Israeli Killers/killings	Palestinian Killers/killings	Total
		n=88	n=58	n=146
Frames	Aggression	38%*	95%*	60%
Terms	Criminality	6%*	69%*	31%
	Degree of Cruelty	8%	34%	18%
	Humanization	28%*	29%*	29%

Aggression Frame: $X^2=47.9$ (df=1), $p<.001$, Criminal terminology: $X^2=65.7$ (df=1), $p<.001$
Degree of Cruelty: $X^2=16.3$ (df=1), $p<.001$, Humanization: No significant difference

The table shows that on days when only one side or the other was killed, Palestinian killings were consistently condemned, while such condemnation was rare for Israeli killings. Both of the techniques used by media to express condemnation—framing and using specific terminology—revealed similar patterns of condemning Palestinian killings. Most notably, articles

almost always used an aggression frame to describe Palestinian killings (95%) and usually described Palestinian killers and killings with criminal terms (69%), while these patterns were much rarer for Israeli killings.

Palestinian killers and killings were also more likely to be described as cruel than Israeli killers and killings, which were almost never described as such. On days in which only Israelis were killed, Palestinian killers or killings were described with terms indicating cruelty in 34% of articles. On the other hand, on days in which only Palestinians were killed, Israeli killers or killings were described as being cruel in just 8% of articles reporting on Israeli killings [$X^2=16.3$ (df=1), $p<.001$]. Finally, the prediction that personal details would be provided about Israeli deceased more often than Palestinian deceased was not supported. There was no significant difference in the degree to which Israeli deceased (29%) and Palestinian deceased (28%) were humanized.

Prominence

Hypothesis 3 predicted that, through the use of certain reporting conventions, the two newspapers would legitimate the Israeli side by assigning more prominence to it than the Palestinian side. Specifically, it was predicted that Israelis would be quoted more than Palestinians and that Israeli deaths would be emphasized more than Palestinian deaths.

Table 3: Israeli and Palestinian quotes when Israelis killed Palestinians

	Israelis	Palestinians
	N=89*	n=89*
Articles with 0 quotes	12%	21%
Articles with 1-2 quotes	36%	34%
Articles with 3 or more	52%	45%

When Israelis kill Palestinians: $X^2=2.6$ (df=2), $p<.270$

Table 4: Palestinian and Israeli quotes when Palestinians killed Israelis

	Israelis n=57*	Palestinians n=57*
Articles with 0 quotes	7%	18%
Articles with 1-2 quotes	25%	51%
Articles with 3 or more	68%	32%

When Palestinians kill Israelis: $X^2=15.5$ (df=2), $p<.001$

As tables 3 and 4 show, Israeli sources were quoted significantly more than Palestinian sources on days when Palestinians killed Israelis. However, no significant difference was found on days when Israelis killed Palestinians, indicating a possible movement toward more balance on such days. On these days, Israelis were quoted three or more times in 52% of articles and not quoted at all in 12% of articles. Palestinians were quoted three or more times in 45% of articles and were not quoted in 21%.

On days when Palestinians killed Israelis, the disparity in Israeli and Palestinian sources quotes was quite pronounced. On such days, Israelis were quoted three or more times in 68% of articles and were not quoted at all in just 7% of articles. Palestinians were quoted three or more times in 32% of articles and were not quoted at all in 18% of articles [$X^2=15.5$ (df=2), $p<.001$].

Table 5 shows that the two newspapers used various reporting conventions to highlight Israeli deaths more than Palestinian deaths.

Table 5: Degree to which Israeli and Palestinian deaths were prominently displayed (on days when only one side or the other died)

	Israeli Killings [Palestinian deceased] n=88	Palestinian killings [Israeli deceased] N=58
Front Page	29%*	60%*
Violence as Main Theme	76%*	90%*
Deaths in Headline	24%*	74%*
Deaths After Paragraph 5	40%*	9%*

Front Page: $X^2=13.6$ (df=1), $p<.003$, Violence main theme: $X^2=4.2$ (df=1), $p<.040$, First Mention of Deaths: $X^2=51.3$ (df=16), $p<.001$

On days when only Israelis were killed, the deaths made the front page 60% of the time while, in contrast, articles describing Palestinian deaths made the front page 29% of the time [$X^2=13.6$ (df=1), $p<.003$]. Also, results reveal that although violence was the main theme of nearly all articles regardless of which side was the perpetrator, violence was more likely to be the main theme when Palestinians killed Israelis. When Palestinians killed Israelis, violence was the main theme 90% of the time, compared to 76% of the time when Palestinians were killed [$X^2=4.2$ (df=1), $p<.040$]. Finally, findings also show that on days when only Israelis were killed, the Israeli deaths were reported in the headline 74% of the time and very rarely (9%) reported after an article's fifth paragraph. Conversely, on days when only Palestinians were killed, the Palestinian deaths were reported in the headline in just 24% of articles and were not mentioned until sometime after the fifth paragraph 40% of the time [$X^2=51.3$ (df=16), $p<.001$].

Results Part II: 'Both' Death Days (days when both Israelis and Palestinians were killed)

Articles covering both Israeli and Palestinian killings and deaths are thought to offer perhaps the best comparison of legitimation and de-legitimation of Israeli and Palestinian violence. In general, result show that articles reporting on both Israeli and Palestinian deaths legitimated the Israeli side and de-legitimated the Palestinian side in ways similar to articles covering only one side's deaths. On some variables the bias was more pronounced than on days when only one side was killed, and other variables indicated a movement toward more balanced coverage.

Justification

The data presented in table 6 shows support for hypothesis 1. The table shows that on days when both sides suffered casualties, the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune*, just as they had done in cases when only one side was killed, frequently offered justification for Israeli killings by

using frames that explained Israeli killings as acts of defense and war. Again, the newspapers infrequently described Palestinian killings in such ways. The newspapers also offered very regular explicit rationales for Israeli killings, but not for Palestinian killings.

Table 6: Justification for Israeli and Palestinian killings (on days when both sides suffered casualties)

		Days when both sides suffered casualties			
		Israeli Killers (only one side killed)	Israeli Killers	Palestinian Killers	Palestinian Killers (only one side killed)
		n=88	N=185	n=185	N=58
Frames	Self-Def/security	52%	68%	9%	16%
	War/battle	55%	48%	24%	3%
	Explic. Rationale	63%	67%	20%	29%
	Accident	11%	14%	2%	2%
Terms	War	97%	97%	48%	28%

More than two-thirds (68%) of articles framed Israeli killings as acts of self-defense/security, while only 9% framed Palestinian killings as such. Also, in nearly half of articles (48%), the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* used a war/battle frame to describe Israeli killings, compared with 24% for Palestinian killings. Two-thirds of articles offered explicit rationale for Israeli killings, while only 20% did for Palestinian killings. Israeli killings and killers were more likely (97%) to be described with war terms than Palestinian killings and killers (48%), but the disparity was not as large as on ‘only’ death days. It can be said that, compared with days when only one side was killed, when both sides suffered casualties the newspapers were more likely to describe Palestinians as being at war and Israelis as acting in defense.

Condemnation

Hypothesis 2, which predicted that Palestinian violence would be condemned, was supported across three of four indicators. One indicator—humanization—suggested de-legitimation of Israeli killings.

Table 7: Condemnation of Israeli and Palestinian killings (when both sides died)

		Days when both sides suffered casualties			
		Israeli Killers/killings (only one side killed)	Israeli killers	Palestinian Killers	Palestinian Killers/killings (only one side killed)
		n=88	N=185	N=185	N=58
Frames	Aggression	38%	31%	85%	95%
Terms	Criminality	6%	3%	75%	69%
	Dgre of cruel.	8%	11%	25%	34%
	Humanization	28%	39%	30%	29%

Table 7 shows that the two newspapers used an aggression frame to describe Palestinian killings in 85% of articles, and to describe Israeli killings in 31% of articles.

With respect to terminology used by the newspapers, Palestinian killers and killings were very often described in criminal ways (75% of articles) while Israeli killers or killings were almost never described in such ways (3% of articles). Additionally, although Palestinian killers or the killings they carried out were only infrequently described as being cruel (25% of articles), they were more likely to be described as such than Israeli killers or killings (11% of articles). Finally, the newspapers were slightly more likely to provide personal details about Palestinian deceased than Israeli deceased—the only instance in which the papers showed a tendency to de-legitimize Israeli killings.

Considered together, tables 6 and 7 show that on days when both sides suffered casualties, the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* legitimated Israeli killings by implicitly and explicitly justifying them and de-legitimated Palestinian killings by condemning them. These patterns are very similar to those found on days when only one side was killed. However, there are some

differences compared to days when only one side was killed. First, Palestinians were more likely on days when both sides were killed to be described as taking part in a war. This is perhaps due to the fact that in articles that cover casualties on both sides, it is difficult to describe one side (Israel) as being in a war without at the same time suggesting that the other side is also at war. Aggression and self-defense indicators show that Palestinians were portrayed as the aggressors in the war, while Israelis were depicted most often as victims who acted violently only in defense.

Prominence

Hypothesis 3, which predicted that the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* would use certain reporting conventions to legitimate the Israeli perspective by assigning it more prominence than the Palestinian perspective, was supported. Specifically, it was found that on days when both sides suffered fatalities, Israeli sources were quoted more often than Palestinian sources, and Israeli deaths were highlighted more.

Table 8: Number of Isr. and Pal. quotes on days when both sides suffered casualties

	‘Both’ Death Days		‘Palestinian Only’ Death Days		‘Israeli Only’ Death Days	
	Israelis	Pals	Israelis	Pals	Israelis	Pals
	N=181	n=181	n=89	N=89	N=57	n=57
Articles w/0 quotes	10%	18%	12%	21%	7%	18%
w/1-2 quotes	30%	43%	36%	34%	25%	51%
with 3 or more	60%	39%	52%	45%	68%	32%

Table 8 shows that when both sides suffered casualties, Israelis sources were quoted more often than Palestinian sources. Israelis were quoted three or more times in 60% of articles and were not quoted at all in only 10% of articles. Palestinians were quoted three or more times in 39% of articles and were not quoted at all in 18% of articles.

Recall that the results of the quote analysis when only one side was killed were mixed. When Palestinians killed Israelis, the Israeli quote advantage was marked, but when Israelis killed Palestinians the sides were quoted similar amounts. As table 9 shows, the Israeli quote advantage was nearly as marked on days when both sides suffered casualties as it was when only Israelis were killed. Table 9 demonstrates that Israeli deaths were emphasized more than Palestinian deaths on ‘both’ death days.

Table 9: First mention of deaths, focus of article (on days when both sides suffered casualties)

	Deaths	
	Israeli n=185	Palestinian N=185
Mentioned First	60%	41%
Focus of Article	27%	12%

Mentioned First: $X^2=13.2$ (df=1), $p<.001$; Focus of Articles: $X^2=13.6$ (df=1), $p<.001$

When both Palestinian and Israeli deaths were reported in the same article, Palestinian deaths were mentioned first about 40.5% of the time, and Israeli deaths were mentioned first 59.5% of the time. These differences were found to be statistically significant [$X^2=13.2$ (df=1), $p<.001$]. Table 10 also shows that Israeli deaths were more likely (27%) to be the focus of an article than Palestinian deaths (12%).⁷

Summary of Results Part II

Some similarities, but also some interesting differences, are revealed when comparing the results of this analysis of days when both sides suffered casualties with the results of the previous analysis that considered days when only one side suffered casualties. Generally speaking, the newspapers – just as they had done on days when only one side was killed – tended to legitimate

⁷ Both sides’ deaths were focused on equally in 31% of articles. In 30% of articles, neither sides’ deaths were the focus.

Israeli killings on days when both sides suffered fatalities. However, the pro-Israeli bias manifested itself slightly differently. The war/battle frame was more balanced, with Palestinian killings more likely and Israeli killings less likely to be framed as acts of war. The self-defense frame was less balanced, however, with even more Israeli killings framed as self-defense and less Palestinian killings framed as such. Both sides were slightly less likely to have their killings framed as acts of aggression. These changes may be explained by the nature of 'death days'. On days when both sides are killed, it is perhaps easier to resort to a war frame to describe violence, to identify one side as the initiator of the hostilities and the other as victim.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to analyze how the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* framed the violent actions of Israelis and Palestinians during the ongoing intifada to find out what framing devices the papers used to express pro-Israeli bias. Legitimation was the key construct of this study because, it was argued, media express support or opposition through processes of legitimation and de-legitimation. Legitimation/de-legitimation of violent actions was of three types: justification, condemnation, and prominence.

Results, which demonstrated support for all three hypotheses, suggest that the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* used frames to justify Israeli killings, assign prominence to the Israeli perspective and tended to condemn Palestinian killings. More precisely, explicit rationale was offered regularly for Israeli killings and Israeli killings were frequently framed as acts of self-defense and/or war and sometimes as accidents. Palestinian killings, on the other hand, were regularly de-legitimated by being framed as unnecessarily aggressive, and Palestinian killers and killings were often described as cruel and criminal. Also, Israeli sources were quoted more than Palestinian sources and Israeli deaths were displayed more prominently than Palestinian deaths.

The pattern of Israeli legitimation and Palestinian de-legitimation was sustained under both of the major ‘death day’ conditions — days when only one side suffered casualties, and days when people on both sides died. There was some evidence of increased pro-Israeli bias on days when both sides suffered casualties. For example, on days when people on both sides died, Israeli violent actions were more likely to be explicitly justified and framed as acts of defense/security, and Palestinian violent acts were less likely to be explicitly justified and framed as acts of defense/security. Other variables showed evidence of more balance on days when both sides died. For instance, Palestinian killings were more likely to be framed as acts of war on days when people on both sides died. These apparent inconsistencies can be explained by the nature of days on which both sides suffer fatalities. On such days, the confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians is more direct, and an active battle between the two sides is apparent. Pro-Israeli biases, which generally project Israel as a victim of Palestinian aggression, are expectedly more pronounced in the face of such direct confrontation and obvious comparison. The increased frequency of the battle frame to describe Palestinian perpetrated killings is a consequence of the discussion about violence in articles describing deaths on both sides. It is difficult to describe one side as taking part in a war without at the same time describing the other side as also being part of the war.


The result of such coverage patterns is the projection of Israelis as righteous, helpless victims who only act out violently to protect themselves from Palestinian aggressors who lack civility. Providing explicit rationale for Israeli killings might have the effect of allowing readers to understand why, from an Israeli perspective, Israeli violent actions are carried out. On the other hand, the lack of explicit rationale for Palestinian violent actions might cause readers to assume the actions are carried out for weak, unjustifiable reasons. More Israeli quotes and more prominently

displayed Israeli deaths likely cause readers to identify more with the Israeli side than the Palestinian side, which comes across as the prototypical 'other'. These coverage trends are all the more significant when considered in light of actual intifada realities, including casualty figures, which show that for every Israeli death there are about three Palestinian deaths.

The major contribution of this research is that it provides a comprehensive description of the process by which certain framing mechanisms through which bias is expressed in coverage of violent conflicts. Many previous studies assessing media coverage of violent conflicts have attempted only to ascertain the direction and extent of bias, without seeking to outline a set of indicators that can be applied more or less universally. This study's detailed delineations of legitimation through justification, de-legitimation through condemnation, and legitimation through prominence, and the indicators that correspond to each, can be applied to any media analysis of violent conflicts. Bias naturally proceeds through one or more of the indicators identified in this study. The following diagram makes clear the process through which bias is expressed in coverage of violent conflicts:

Diagram 1: *The process of bias expression in media coverage of violent conflicts*

MEDIA BIAS IN COVERAGE OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS



A limitation of this research is that it didn't formally assess the impact of coverage on newspaper readers. Although media frames offer preferred readings, audiences negotiate these readings and do not always accept the media's interpretations. Future research should analyze the effects of coverage on readers in order to determine whether readers accept or oppose dominant press accounts.

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Appendix 1: CODING SHEET

NEWSPAPER DATE

1. Newspaper date _____

SEPTEMBER 11

2. Was the article before or after 9/11/01?
a. Before
b. After

NEWSPAPER NAME

3. Newspaper
a. New York Times
b. Chicago Tribune

ARTICLE NUMBER

4. What is the article #? _____

DECEASED IDENTIFIER

5. According to the newspaper report, who died on the day in question?
a. Palestinian(s) Only
b. Israeli(s) Only
c. Both
d. Not clear

NUMBER OF DEAD

6. According to the article, how many Palestinians died on the day in question? _____

NUMBER OF DEAD

7. According to the article, how many Israelis died on the day in question? _____

NUMBER OF DEAD

8. According to the article, how many Palestinian children under age 18 died on the day in question? _____

NUMBER OF DEAD

9. According to the article, how many Israeli children under age 18 died on the day in question? _____

INFORMATION SOURCES

10. In the article, who is the source(s) of information about the death(s)?
a. Israeli sources only
b. Palestinian sources only
c. Both Israeli and Palestinian sources
d. Other sources or not clear or no sources attributed

STORY PLACEMENT

11. Where is the story placed?

- a. Front Page
- b. Inside Page

PROMINENCE: THEME

12. Is violence the main theme of the article?

- a. Yes
- b. No

PROMINENCE: QUOTES

13. How many times are Palestinians quoted in the article?

- a. 0
- b. 1-2
- c. 3 or more

PROMINENCE: QUOTES

14. How many times are Israelis quoted in the article?

- a. 0
- b. 1-2
- c. 3 or more

DEATH TOLL

15. Is a total intifada death toll given?

- a. Yes
- b. No

IF YOU ANSWERED 'C' TO QUESTION 5, SKIP AHEAD TO QUESTION 27

PROMINENCE: DEATH PLACEMENT

16. Specifically, where in the article are the deaths first mentioned?

- a. Headline
- b. Lead paragraph
- c. Paragraph 2 – 3
- d. Paragraph 4-5
- e. After paragraph 5

JUSTIFICATION: SELF-DEFENSE

17. In the context of the killings only, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings or the killers?

- Defense, Protection, Response, Retaliation, Revenge, Counter, Retort, Prevent -

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: DEGREE OF CRUELTY

18. In the context of the killings only, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings or the killers?

- Murder, ambush, savage, slaughter, massacre, slaying, butchering, rampage -

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: HUMANIZATION

19. Are personal details (e.g. name, occupation, hobbies, grieving family, etc.) about any of the deceased given?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: WAR TERMINOLOGY

20. At any point in the article, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings or the killers?

- Military, officer, soldier, security, police, troops, forces -

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: CRIMINALITY

21. At any point in the article, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings or the killers?

- militant, extremist, fundamentalist, terrorist, villain, insurgents, criminal -

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: FRAME

22. Is a *defense/security* frame used to describe the killings?

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: FRAME

23. Is an *aggressive violence* frame used to describe the killings?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: FRAME

24. Is a *war/battle* frame used to describe the killings?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: FRAME

25. Is an *accident* frame used to describe the killings?

- a. Yes

- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: EXPLICIT RATIONALE

26. Is rationale given for the killings?
- a. Yes, by the reporter
 - b. Yes, by the killers
 - c. No

UNLESS BOTH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS DIED ON THE DAY IN QUESTION, DO NOT ANSWER QUESTIONS 27 – 48

PROMINENCE: IMPORTANCE OF DEATH

27. If both Israelis and Palestinians died, which side's deceased are mentioned first?
- a. Palestinians
 - b. Israelis

PROMINENCE: IMPORTANCE OF DEATH - FOCUS

28. Which side's death was the focus of the article?
- a. Israeli
 - b. Palestinian
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither

PALESTINIAN JUSTIFICATION: SELF-DEFENSE

29. Are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Palestinians or the Palestinian killers (in the context of the killings only)?
- Defense, Protection, Response, Retaliation, Revenge, Counter, Retort, Prevent -
- a. Yes
 - b. No

ISRAELI JUSTIFICATION: SELF-DEFENSE

30. In the context of the killings only, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Israelis or the Israeli killers?
- Defense, Protection, Response, Retaliation, Revenge, Counter, Retort, Prevent -
- a. Yes
 - b. No

PALESTINIAN CONDEMNATION: DEGREE OF CRUELTY

31. In the context of the killings only, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Palestinians or the Palestinian killers?
- Murder, ambush, savage, slaughter, massacre -
- a. Yes
 - b. No

ISRAELI CONDEMNATION: DEGREE OF CRUELTY

32. In the context of the killings only, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Israelis or the Israeli killers?

- Murder, ambush, savage, slaughter, massacre -

- a. Yes
- b. No

ISRAELI CONDEMNATION: HUMANIZATION

33. Are personal details (e.g. name, occupation, hobbies, grieving family, etc.) about any of the Palestinian deceased given?

- a. Yes
- b. No

PALESTINIAN CONDEMNATION: HUMANIZATION

34. Are personal details (e.g. name, occupation, hobbies, grieving family, etc.) about any of the Israeli deceased given?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: PALESTINIAN WAR TERMINOLOGY

35. At any point in the article, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Palestinians or the Palestinian killers?

- Military, officer, soldier, security, police, troops, forces -

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: PALESTINIAN CRIMINALITY

36. At any point in the article, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Palestinians or the Palestinian killers?

- militant, extremist, fundamentalist, terrorist, villain, insurgents, criminal -

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: ISRAELI WAR TERMINOLOGY

37. At any point in the article, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Israelis or the Israeli killers?

- Military, officer, soldier, security, police, troops, forces -

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: ISRAELI CRIMINALITY

38. At any point in the article, are any of the following words (or words similar to them) used to describe the killings carried out by Israelis or the Israeli killers?

- militant, extremist, fundamentalist, terrorist, villain, insurgents, criminal -

- a. Yes

- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: PALESTINIAN FRAME

39. Is a *defense/security* frame used to describe the Palestinian killings (that killed Israelis)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: PALESTINIAN FRAME

40. Is an *aggressive violence* frame used to describe the Palestinian killings (that killed Israelis)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: PALESTINIAN FRAME

41. Is a *war/battle* frame used to describe the Palestinian killings (that killed Israelis)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: PALESTINIAN FRAME

42. Is an *accident* frame used to describe the Palestinian killings (that killed Israelis)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: ISRAELI FRAME

43. Is a *defense/security* frame used to describe the Israeli killings (that killed Palestinians)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

CONDEMNATION: ISRAELI FRAME

44. Is an *aggressive violence* frame used to describe the Israeli killings (that killed Palestinians)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: ISRAELI FRAME

45. Is a *war/battle* frame used to describe the Israeli killings (that killed Palestinians)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: ISRAELI FRAME

46. Is an *accident* frame used to describe the Israeli killings (that killed Palestinians)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: PALESTINIAN EXPLICIT RATIONALE

47. Is justification given for the Palestinian killings?

- a. Yes
- b. No

JUSTIFICATION: ISRAELI EXPLICIT RATIONALE

48. Is justification given for the Israeli killings?

- a. Yes
- b. No

Appendix 2: Intercoder Reliability

The table that follows documents results of the final round of reliability tests:

Variable	Variable #'s	% Agreement	Scott's Pi
Justification: self-defense/security frame	22, 39, 43	(61-80) 76%	<u>0.53</u>
Justification: war/battle frame	24, 41, 45	(57-80) 71%	<u>0.34</u>
Justification: war terms	20, 35, 37	(68-80) 85%	<u>0.37</u>
Explicit Rationale	26, 47, 48	(69-80) 86%	0.72
Justification: accident frame	25, 42, 46	(71-80) 89%	<u>0.51</u>
Condemnation: aggression frame	23, 40, 44	(61-80) 76%	<u>0.52</u>
Condemnation: criminality	21, 36, 38	(73-80) 91%	0.81
Condemnation: degree of cruel	18, 31, 32	(72-80) 90%	0.7
Condemnation: Humanization	19, 33, 34	(73-80) 91%	0.82
Prominence: Israeli quotes	14	42-53 (79%)	0.61
Prominence: Palestinian quotes	13	45-53 (85%)	0.77
Prominence: Story Placement	11	53-53 (100%)	1
Prominence: Death Placement	16	25-26 (96%)	0.95
Prominence: Violence main	12	48-53 (91%)	0.66

theme			
Who died?	5	45-53 (85%)	<u>0.75</u>

*Scott's pi scores below the generally acceptable .6 level are underlined